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H. B. 491: OHIO'S NEW TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION

Governmental power to compel persons to testify in court is firmly
established in American law.' Both the constitutions of the United
States and Ohio, however, set forth a privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination.' Statutes which empower a court to compel
testimony over a claim of privilege against self-incrimination in return
for protection against criminal punishment are called immunity
statutes. Such statutes seek a rational accommodation between the
constitutional imperatives of the privilege against self-incrimination
and the governmental need for testimony.3 The United States Supreme
Court has characterized immunity statutes as essential to the efficient
enforcement of certain criminal statutes." Mr. Justice Frankfurter
observed that immunity statutes have "become part of our constitutional fabric."
In Kastigar v. United States,6 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that in order to compel testimony over a witness' claim of
privilege against self-incrimination, a court must grant "use and
derivative use" immunity to the witness. "Use and derivative use" immunity means that neither the actual compelled testimony nor information directly or indirectly derived from the compelled testimony
may be used as evidence against the witness in any subsequent criminal
action.'
Use and derivative use immunity has been criticized as inadequate
because, as Mr. Justice Marshall concluded in his dissent in Kastigar, it
fails to place the witness in the same position with the government as
he would have been in had he not testified.8 As a practical matter, it is
very difficult to determine in a subsequent criminal proceeding
whether the prosecution's evidence has been obtained independently of
or derived from the compelled testimony.9 Under use and derivative
1. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 n.15 (1956); Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10.
3. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972).
4. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896).
5. 350 U.S. at 438.
6. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
7. Id. at 448-49.
8. Id. at 468.
9. See Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REV.
103, 165; Note, The Unconstitutionalityof Use Immunity: Half a Loaf Is Not Enough,
46 So. CAL. L. REv. 202, 208 (1972).
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use immunity, the government is not prevented from focusing an investigation on a witness as a result of compelled testimony in order to
gain "independent" evidence which it might not otherwise have considered or pursued.'" Furthermore, if the witness chooses to testify in
his own behalf in a subsequent criminal proceeding, there is a real
possibility that information obtained from the compelled testimony
may be used for impeachment purposes without any direct reference to
the source of the information."
In 1978, the Ohio Legislature repealed the existing provision for
grants of use and derivative use immunity and enacted a new section
2945.44, which is substantially identical to Rule 732 of the Uniform
Rules of Criminal Procedure." The Ohio Revised Code now provides
that a witness compelled to testify over his claim of privilege against
self-incrimination "shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any
criminal penalty . . . for or on account of any transaction or matter
concerning which . . . he gave an answer or produced any information." 3 This "transactional" immunity puts the compelled witness in
at least as good a position as he would have been in had he not
testified." Thus, by providing for grants of transactional rather than
use and derivative use immunity, Ohio has taken a step beyond the
constitutional requirements set forth in Kastigarand should avoid the
problems inherent in use and derivative use immunity.
II. ANALYSIS
Protection against prosecution for any transaction about which the
witness testifies is a broad grant of immunity, but there are limitations.
Section 2945.44 provides that a witness will not be prosecuted for any5
transaction about which he testifies "in compliance with the order."'
The comments to Rule 732 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure explain this language to mean that no immunity will attach to
an answer or to information produced which is not responsive to the
10.

United States v. Friedland, 441 F.2d 855, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,

404 U.S. 867 (1971).
11. Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the
Candor
12.
13.
14.

and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1223 (1971).
1978 Ohio Legis. Bull. 140.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
406 U.S. at 468-69 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority in Kastigar con-

cluded that the transactional immunity affords broader protection than does the fifth

amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 453. From that proposition, it

follows that the majority in Kastigarmight also conclude that transactional immunity
places the witness in a better position than if he had not testified.
15.

OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
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question asked.' 6 While Ohio did not adopt the comments to the
uniforn rule as law, they are nevertheless helpful in interpreting the
languag of section 2945.44. The "responsiveness" limitation is a
brake against unnecessary grants of immunity' 7 and is a barrier to the
witness who would intentionally tender information not sought in an
effort to insulate himself from subsequent criminal prosecution. 8 Section 2945.44 also provides that if, in fact, the witness had no privilege
to withhold testimony or to refuse to produce information, then no
immunity will attach to the testimony.' 9 Again, unnecessary grants of
immunity are to be avoided. 0
One of the most significant aspects of the new immunity statute is
that no grant of immunity may be made except on the prosecutor's
written request to the court. 2' Under prior Ohio law, when a witness
refused to testify, immunity could be granted to that witness upon the
request of either the prosecutor or the defendant,2 2 or upon the court's
own initiative.23 In refusing this power to the defendant and the trial
judge, the comments to rule 732 state that "immunity is essentially a
law enforcement instrument and the enforcement authorities constitute
the proper agency to exercise the principal control over immunity
24
grants.''
Even though section 2945.44 precludes the court from intiating immunity grants, the court retains some authority to prevent abuses. Section 2945.44 permits the court to refuse to grant immunity and thus to
refuse to compel testimony if it finds that to grant immunity "would
not further the administration of justice." 2 5 The comments to rule 732
conclude that this provision allows the court the authority to prevent
abuses but provides no standard for determining when a grant of immunity would not further the administration of justice. 2" Because immunity is to be considered primarily a prosecutorial tool, the court
16. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 732(b), Comment D.
17. Id.
18. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 477
(1972) (dealing with the "responsiveness" limitation in N.J. REV. STAT. § 52:9M-17(b)
(1970)).
19. "If, but for this section, the witness would have been privileged to withhold
an answer or any information.. .. " OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44(B) (Page Supp.
1978).
20. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 732(b), Comment C.
21. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1978).
22. State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d 17, 17, 321 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1974).
23. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44 (Page 1975) (repealed 1976); 1976 Ohio
Laws 4-99 (amending § 2945.44) (repealed 1978).
24. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 732(a), Comment.
25. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
26. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 732(a), Comment.
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should exercise its discretion to deny immunity only where it is
substantially clear that the testimony at issue is not necessary to maintain a prosecution or fully explore the alleged wrongdoing, or is otherwise irrelevant or immaterial.
Section 2945.44 also provides that a witness' claim of privilege
against self-incrimination is necessary to trigger a request for and a
grant of immunity. 2 The language of the prior immunity statute indicated that a limited grant of immunity was not precluded by a volun2
tary waiver of a witness' constitutional privilege. " This change reflects
the belief that immunity should be used only when necessary to obtain
evidence which is otherwise unavailable and is tied to the policy of
avoiding gratuitous grants of immunity.2 9 This requirement, by giving
the prosecution notice of those matters which the witness deems incriminating, affords the prosecutor a better basis for considering the
3
advisability of a grant of immunity in a given situation. "
Use and derivative use immunity does not protect a witness from
31
prosecution for a crime or activity about which he testified; rather,
use and derivative use immunity means that neither the actual compelled testimony nor information directly or indirectly derived from the
compelled testimony may be used as evidence against the witness in
any subsequent criminal action.32 Transactional immunity, on the
other hand, does protect the witness from prosecution for any criminal
act about which he testified." Because transactional immunity provides greater protection for the compelled witness than does use and
derivative use immunity, the witness is more likely to tell what he
knows and to tell it truthfully.3 ' Thus, transactional immunity offers
greater bargaining power to the government to further its enforcement
efforts.3 5
According to section 2945.44, the court must inform the witness
that he will receive immunity under the statute prior to compelling
testimony.36 It is not clear whether the court need only inform the
§ 2945.44(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
1976 Ohio Laws 4-99 (amending § 2945.44) (repealed 1978).

27.
28.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

29.

UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d at 17, 321 N.E.2d at 892.
406 U.S. at 448-49.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 732(b), Comment B(6).

732(a), Comment.

35. •Note, Immunity From Prosecutionand the Fifth Amendment: An Analysis of
Constitutional Standards, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1229 (1972).
36. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.55(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1978). If -It]he court of

common pleas informs the witness that by answering, or producing the information he
will receiv immunity under division (B) of this section."
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witness that he has immunity and therefore must testify, or whether
the court must explain that he will be immune from prosecution for
any matter about which he testifies. Because a witness who has transactional immunity is more likely to testify freely and truthfully, it
would be in the best interests of justice to make sure that the witness
understands the scope of his immunity. Therefore, this requirement
should be interpreted to require the judge to briefly explain the scope
of immunity under section 2945.44 prior to compelling testimony.
An important issue regarding a witness' privilege against selfincrimination is whether a state which has granted immunity under its
laws may compel a witness to give testimony which would incriminate
him in another jurisdiction. In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbor,37 the United States Supreme Court concluded that
"the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state
witness against incrimination under federal law as well as state law and
a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal
law." 3 8 The Court held that where a witness is granted immunity under
state law, the state can compel the testimony despite the risk of incrimination under federal law, but the federal court is prohibited from
making any use of such compelled testimony or of its fruits. 9 The
Court indicated that the result would be the same if the testimony is
compelled by the federal court and used by the state.40 Accordingly, it
has been held that when one jurisdiction compels self-incriminating
testimony under a grant of immunity, a second jurisdiction must
respect that grant of immunity and refrain from the use of that compelled testimony or its fruits in any subsequent criminal action.4
It does not follow, however, that a grant of transactional immunity
in one judiction becomes transactional immunity in the second
jurisdiction;" rather, a witness granted transactional immunity in
Ohio may have use and derivative use immunity in the second
jurisdiction. Thus, whenever testimony is compelled in Ohio under section 2945.44 and the incriminting nature of the testimony relates to
other jurisdictions, the quality of the testimony may be affected by the
witness' fear of future prosecutions in other jurisdictions.
37. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
38. Id. at 77-78.
39. Id. at 79.
40. Id. at 53 n.1.
41. In re Bianchi, 542 F.2d 98, 101 (1st Cir. 1976).
42. See United States v. Anzalone, 555 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1977), rehearingdenied,
98 S.Ct. 732 (1978) (transactional immunity granted by New York, use immunity
recognized by federal court); People v. Lev, 91 Misc. 2d 241, 398 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1977)
(New York defendant with transactional immunity would receive use immunity in New
Jersey court).
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It also does not follow that a witness who incriminates himself
under Ohio law while testifying under immunity in another jurisdiction
will have transactional immunity in Ohio merely because section
2945.44 provides for transactional immunity. Rather, immunity is
granted under section 2945.44 when a witness is compelled to testify
'4 3 Furthermore, under
"[in any criminal proceeding in this state."
Murphy, it is not the second jurisdiction's immunity statute which forbids the use of the compelled testimony or its fruits; rather it is the
witness' constitutional privilege against self-incrimination which
demands that protection."
Finally, it is important to note that section 2945.44 does not protect the compelled witness from prosecution and criminal penalties for
any perjury, falsification, or tampering with evidence committed while
testifying under a grant of immunity.
III.

CONCLUSION

Section 2945.44 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that a witness
compelled to testify over a claim of privilege against self-incrimination
will be given transactional immunity. The statute also provides that no
grant of immunity may be made except upon a written request by the
prosecutor, and that a witness' initial refusal to answer upon a claim
of privilege against self-incrimination is necessary to trigger the request
for, and the grant of, immunity. Furthermore, the court must inform
the witness that he will receive immunity under the statute prior to
compelling the testimony. The transactional immunity granted under
section 2945.44, however, will not necessarily extend into any other
jurisdiction in which the witness' compelled testimony incriminates
him; rather, the witness will usually be protected by use and derivative
use in those other jurisdictions to which the incriminating testimony
relates.
David A. Hampel
Code Sections Affected: § 2945.44.
Effective date: May 30, 1978.
Sponsors: Tranter (H), Celebreeze (S).
Committee: Judiciary (H & S).
43.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44(A) (Page Supp. 1978).

44.

378 U.S. at 77-78.

45.

OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44(C) (Page Supp. 1978).
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